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REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS
PSYCHO-MOTOR NORMS FOR PRACTICAL DIAGNOSIS: A STUDY OF THE
SEGUIN FORM-BoARD, BASED ON THE IREcoRDs OF 4,072 NORMAL AND

ABNORMAL

BOYS AND, GIRLS, WITH YEARLY AND

By J. E. Wallace Wallin. Psychological Monographs, vol. xxii, No. 2. August, 1916. Whole
No. 97. Pp. 102. $1.00.
The idea of this study is indicated by the title. Dr. Wallin applied the Sequin form-board, as modified by Norsworthy and by Goddard to 446 clinic cases observed by him at Pittsburgh and St. Louis
to 1,429 school children at Pittsburgh and to 308 epileptics. He has
also incorporated in some of his tables data from Sylvester's study of
1,588 children and from Goddard's study of 250 children.
Each child made three trials, in each of which he was urged to do
his best. His time was taken with a stop watch from the touching of
the first block to the correct placing of the last one; also, a record was made of every falge move made, though the study deals practically
entirely with the time scores.
The original data are given in very extensive form in a series of
tables comprising the final (seventh) chapter of the monograph. Chapter I explains the purpose and method of investigation. Wallin regards
the form-board as a most useful device, as "a test of form perception,
movement and intelligence-that is, of psycho-motor development."
Intelligence, he says, is measured because the test "requires a rapid
adjustment to a novel and complicated situation," but in the next paragraph goes on to say, "we need comprehensive scales of motor capacity
no less than of intellectual development," which sounds as if the form- board was not much concerned with intellectual development.
In any event, he says rightly that tests are of little value diagnostically unless fortified with reliable age norms and unless the dependence
of these norms on other factors, like sex, mental capacity, etc., is also
known. The remaining chapters deal with these dependencies.
Chapter II deals with the dependence on age. Speed with the
form-board increases with chronological and with mental age, more
rapidly in the earlier years, when semi-yearly norms are feasible, more
slowly in the later years (after 12), when bi-yearly norms are enough,
and at least to 17, though with seeming interruptions at the ages 8 and
13. One rather striking fact is that the averages for normal reported
by Wallin are almost invariably faster than those reported by Sylvester or by Goddard-to take an extreme instance, at 4 years Sylvester gives about 46 seconds, Goddard about 39 seconds, Wallin about
29 seconds as standard performance. The discrepancies amount to
roughly 1.5 years in age assignments-enough to interfere with clinical
inferences, it would seem. Wallin thinks the difference is due to the
circumstance that his cases averaged higher in intelligence and were
incited more to do their best at every trial. Since Sylvester's and
'IALF-YEARLY NORMS.
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Goddard's norms are reprinted here, the user of the form-board can
take his choice.
Chapter III deals with the dependence on intelligence. The main
conclusions are: Bright surpass average and average surpass dull
children; children of the same mental age, but differing chronological
age differ little in psycho-motor efficiency (the factor of chronological
age neutralizes the factor of intelligence) ; brighter children show their
superiority more in the first or second than in the third trial (probably
because of making a more rapid initial adjustment),
Chapter IV deals with sex differences: Boys are slightly superior
to girls (average about 1.3 seconds), though this difference is lessened
in the subnormal. The data are insufficient to show which sex is relatively the more variable. Tentatively, it may be inferred that subnormal males are more dangerous than subnormal females, but that
the abler males surpass the abler females. The male superiority is
greater in the first or the second than in the third trial, hence, Wallin
says, it is desirable to make more than one trial, though the logic is not
clear to the reviewer. That the sexes both seem to reach resting
plateaus at the same years, 8 and 13, is hard to reconcile with other
phenomena of sex growth.
Chapter V deals with the effect of repetition. There is a marked
gain in speed from the first to the second and a less gain from the
second to the third trial. The gain is greater with subnormal children
because their first trial is so slow. Here, again, Wallin argues that the
best score to use is the shortest one (almost always the third), though
it would seem to me obvious from his own figures that subnormality is
best brought out in the first trial. Practice curves, in any case, differ
with degree of mentality.
Chapter VI deals with variability of form-board performance,
which is considerably greater for subnormal than for normal children,
and which decreases from trial to trial and with increasing chronological or mental age.
This monograph represents a deal of tedious work and its tabular
summary will be welcomed by other investigators. It remains to be
seen how much use can be made of it for the "practical diagnosis"
-specified in its title.
G. M. WIIPPLE.
Carnegie Institute of Technology.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT. By S. A. Martin. Boston, Richard
G. Badger, 1916. Pp. 238. $1.50.
"Men change and times change with them, but the principles of
moral truth are older than the earth, and shall abide when the elements
shall melt with fervent heat, and the heavens shall be, as an outworn
garment, folded up and laid aside, still the laws of nature, moral laws
as well as mathematical or physical, shall abide, steadfast and unchanged" (p. 20). That moral truth is immutable and eternal, fixed
in the constitution of things, ready-made and awaiting discovery by
the moral sense of man-such is the ethical position of Professor
Martin. Although he may claim descent from a long and honorable
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ancestry, this teacher will find few relatives among contemporary
writers on ethics. For some reason, perhaps because his first and foremost purpose was to write a text-book, Professor Martin does not
undertake to defend a type of thought .which would generally, in this
day and age, be considered obsolete. There is a certain charm, it must
be said, in the very positiveness with which these views are set forth,
and, ethically considered, it is good to hear the voice of Cudworth
once more. As an introductory text, the little book has much to
recommend it, but it is not likely to be taken up by university teachers,
because of its remoteness from modern discussions of the problems of
conduct. The more conservative denominational colleges are likely to
find in it "safe and sane" views, in keeping with orthodox Christian
ethics.
D. T. HOWARD.
Northwestern University.
THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

By Various Authors. The Continental Legal History Series,
XI. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1918. Pp.
xlix, 558.
This is the last notable volume in a notable series. The editorial
committee of the series consists of Professors Drake, Freund, Lorenzen, Mikell, and Wigmore (chairman), acting for the Association of
American Law Schools. The legal profession owes this learned committee and the Association under which it has acted, a debt of gratitude which probably can never be suitably acknowledged. A handful
of men of the type represented by the editorial committee, by reason
of command of modern foreign languages and access to foreign legal
literatures, was already in at least constructive possession of the historical learning which this great series has assembled; but for most of
us, until these translations were published, these materials were intellectually as remote as the great crested grebe. Selfishly, the members of the editorial committee would have profited by reserving this
learning to themselves after the fashion of the monopoly enjoyed by
the pontifices of early Roman law. The publication of these eleven
volumes may therefore be regarded like the ius Flavianum or the ius
Aelianum as "a great popular act," and, more than that, a fine expression of idealism.
It would be interesting to know, if the fact were knowable, how
often the generation here and to come will capitalize this investment
of knowledge. That it will prove one of the foundations of our legal
science for years, of that there may be no doubt.

Some of the inter-

mediate volumes of theseries have not yet been issued, but the value
of the enterprise is so apparent that it may be hoped the Association of
American Law Schools will decide to continue its history committee,
and that from time to time additions shall be made to the series as its
program now stands. In that way alone will it be possible for American legal science to keep abreast of the development of historical learning in foreign countries. Perhaps the second series should be given a
broader scope including comparative law in all countries, not limiting
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the field to the continental group. But in speaking in terms of admiration and enthusiasm of the initiative and labors of the editorial committee, it would be an act of injustice not to point out the indispensable
part taken by the translators in the production of these volumes. The
editors properly have made due acknowledgment of their arduous
services. Without the learning, skill, and labor of the translators, the
idea of such a series would have been as the General Preface puts it,
"a fruitless dream."
The present volume (the last of the series) like the first is a
symposium. The reader vill hardly need to be told that under the
title of the book much may be learned from such writers as Alvarez,
Baldwin, Charmont, Georg Cohn, Duguit, Gaudemet, Meili, Nippold,
Perich, Picard, Reinsch, Ripert, Rocco, Vanni, and Wigmore. Of the
countries represented by this array of scholars are Belgium, Chile,
France, Italy, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United States. The translators are Layton B. Register of the Philadelphia bar and Ernest
Bruncken of Washington. whose abilities are already sufficiently attested in other translations which they have made. The failure to include among the fifteen authors entered and the six countries drawn
upon, even a single writer from Austria or Germany arrests one's attention. True enough, there is a Swiss professor who was at one time
at Heidelberg, and there is an essay by another Swiss scholar taken
from a German publication. From a French authority (Gaudemet) we
read of the "biirgerliches Gesetzbuch" as a "masterpiece of method
and science . . . the superb epitome of all the results which German

text-writers obtained in the 1800s in the field of the pandects." From
an Italian (Rocco) we learn of "German leadership in the field of
commercial law during the second half of the 1800s." From other
writers we get suggestions of important developments in German legal
science, of influence on surrounding countries, or of activities important because of their relation to the widespread movement toward international unification of law. Did the writers of Austria and Germany have nothing to say on their own account about these developments? Or is this silence a literary phenomenon of the war? Neither.
As to the question of silence we need not go beyond the present volume to discover that Gierke, Menger, and Sohm (not to mention a
score of other writers) had discussed the drafts of the civil code of
1896, the formulation of which began some twenty years earlier. On
the second question the editorial committee no doubt found what
seemed to the committee a better perspective and better discussions of
that part of continental legal history among the writings of scholars
in other countries. Whether one agrees with the solution or not (and
in other times there would be a rebuttable presumption against it)
there is sufficient to put the reader on inquiry. However, the fact remains, whether of any importance or not, that neither the background
nor the juristic results of the civil code of 1896 receive anything more
than subordinate consideration in this volume. Put whatever may be
thought to be lacking on these points will be found on an extensive
scale in another volume of the same series, which was published prac-
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tically at the same time as the work under review-Huebner's "History
of Germanic Private Law."
But if this compilation shows a predominance of Latin, and,
especially, French writing (of which the learned editor is the chief
patron in this country) the volume has thereby gained in clarity what
it may perhaps have lost in profundity and miscroscopic detail. The
moon shines in France-that we know since we have all read apostrophes to "clair de lune"--4but there is little moonshine in French
scholarship or French legal writing. The French language is, as
Fouill~e has said, "frank and rectilinear." The ideas presented in this
volume by the French group strike out straight from the shoulder, and
the reader is quickly informed precisely as to what is under discussion
and how the author feels about it. Fouill6e in his book ("Modern Idea
of Law") has attempted an elaborate explanation of the quality of
French writing, but we believe he neglects an important national trait
which accounts for the principal part of it-outspoken intellectual and
moral courage.
This volume is in three parts which discuss (1) the readjustment
of law to changed social conditions, (2) codification, and (3) international uniformity of law. Its fourteen chapters are so arranged in the
order in which these topics are discussed, as to make a coherent story
of the changes in the law of the principal countries of continental
Europe since the French Revolution. There is an informative preface by the editor (Professor Wigmore), and there are sympathetic
introductions by Professor Borchard and Sir Frederick Pollock. The
dominant chord is the change (and that is doubtless what is meant by
"progress") from the individualist standpoint of Roman law and the
Code Napol6on to the social r6gime, as shown in the chapters of
Alvarez, Charmont, and Duguit. This is followed by what the harmonists would call a suspension dealing with codification treated by
Alvarez, Perich, Gaudemet, Vanni, and Rocco. The authentic cadence,
if we may so term it, is an explanation of the movement for the international assimilation of law, by Cohn, Ripert, Reinsch, Meili, Baldwin, Picard, Nippold, and W-igmore.
From what has been said by way of description, it will not be
difficult to believe that out of this university of discussion by eminent
thinkers in legal science; one may acquire a liberal fund of authoritative information not to be gathered in any other English book on what
has been the legal situation on the European continent for a century
or more, especially in the fields of private civil law, commercial law,
and private international law. What is of chief interest for readers
of this JOURNAL-criminal law-does not fall within the scope of
this volume, that subject being treated exhaustively in another volume
by von Bar in the same series. Nearly all the chapters well deserve
special consideration in any review of the volume, but since so extensive an analysis would exceed at once the competence of the present
reviewer in so wide a domain, and the space available, we must content
ourselves with an examination of a single chapter--L-that of Duguit.
Duguit is already well known to American readers of legal litera-
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ture through other translations of his writings (in Modern Legal
Philosophy Series, Vol. VII, Illinois Law Review, and other publications) as the greatest iconoclast of legal ideas who has appeared in this
generation. Although Bentham had been admitted as a bencher of
Lincoln's Inn, he withdrew from the legal edifice before he commenced to hurl unfriendly missiles at legal institutions to the discomfiture of many persons of conservative turn of mind, within. But
Duguit in his assault upon the idols of the law stands in the center
of the temple like a scourging Nazarene. He is a professor of law
at Bordeux; he is an authority on public law; he has written numerous
law books; he is thoroughly informed on all phases of importance in
private law; and, lastly, he is a keen analyst of fundamental legal
notions. Like Bentham, he is chiefly occupied in uprooting beliefs
long established. Of course, we are all now liberal enough to tolerate
this sort of activity. We not only tolerate it, we welcome it. We
have seen the three authorities of the ancient world refuted. Our
profoundest beliefs have been shown more than once to be illusions.
Even the laws of nature are subject to contingency. Each day is a
creation ex nihilo. The bouleversement is the thing. When Duguit
diverts the course of the river, the Augean stables had not been
cleaned for thirty years, no not for.twenty centuries!
The first awakening from a peaceful slumber of orthodox dreams
came when Duguit denied the personality and also the sovereignty of
the state. We rubbed our eyes and asked, can this really be true?
We were still asking the same question in a half-awake bewilderment.
Before we can gain our composure, Duguit proceeds with a series of
bomb-like affirmations-affirmations fortified, too, by keen upper-cut
reasoning-which cast a doubt on the validity of an entire series of
legal ideas which have done service since the ancient days of Q. Mucius
Scaevola. That these allegations of iconoclasm, havoc, and repudiation may not appear too much in the spirit of rhapsody, let the author
speak for himself.
"Personally I admit of no dogma in any lint of belief whatsoever."
(p. 66.)
"It can truthfully be said that such a metaphysical conception [of
subjective rights] cannot be maintained in an age of realism and positivism
such as our own." (p. 70.)
"The individual has no rights; neither has a group of individuals."
(p. 73.)
"Property is not a right; it is a social function." (p. 74.)
"Every metaphysical conception must be banished from the science
of law as they have been banished from the other sciences; this is the
price of the law's progress." (p. 91.)
"The entire theory [of artificial personality] explains nothing. A
group either has no will distinct from its members, and in that case it
cannot be a bearer or subject of right, and the law, powerful though it is,
cannot produce what is not existent; or a group has in fact a will distinct
from that of its members, and in that case, it is naturally, of itself, a sub-
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ject of right and the intervention of the legislature or the executive is
unnecessary." (p. 93.) . . . "These controversies are entertaining intellectual pursuits-nothing more. They are useless for the excellent
reason that the problem . . . does not exist. Are groups, associations,
corporations, funds, etc., by nature subjects of right or are they not? I do
not know, and the question does not interest me." (p. 95.)
"Whatever may be the case, I maintain . . . that as modern law
becomes socialized, it is not the inward will but the declared will that is
protected because that alone is an act affecting society." (p. 104.)
"I recognize quite well that often, indeed generally, in practice [a]
juridical state of facts represents a relation between two persons, one of
whom is bound to perform a positive or negative act, and the other of
whom may require such performance. But in contemporary civilization
with its social tendencies, this is not essential." (p. 111.)
"As the autonomy of the individual is disappearing so the sovereignty
of the state is disappearing. As subjective right in the individual exemplified in its most intense form, dominium, is disappearing, so the subjective
right in the state, the imperium, is disappearing. There is no longer any
reason why one source of law should not be those rules of. conduct established by a compact between groups of society and sanctioned by the
material forces of government." (p. 124.)
Duguit stands for realism raised to the "nth" power. These bony
fragments excised from a living torso may not be adequate to exhibit
fully his position, and certainly they can not do it entire justice, yet
enough is disclosed as a basis of discussion.
Professor Keedy in a thoughtful article in Pennsylvania Law
Review some months ago undertook to show that each age is dominated by an organic unity of ideas. The present epoch clearly proves
his point in presenting such a unity or rather a congeries of unities
each struggling with the others for ascendency. The realism of
M. Duguit has its affines with such unrelated things as intuitionism in
philosophy, post-impressionism in painting, vers libre in poetry, and
modernism in religion. It may aplear somewhat venturesome to group
a jurist like Duguit with Richard Strauss, C~zanne, or Rimbaud, and
yet they all in their different fields of expression show the eternal conflict between the rational and the factual, the struggle between form
and matter, the opposition of classicism and romanticism.
Roman law was a system conspicuous for its elegance of format least it became such when it had been worked up and polished in
the hands of specialists. Its underlying concepts have traversed the
world. Even the Common Law however free it may be of Roman doctrine is thoroughly dominated by the Roman legal technic of underlying
legal conceptions. M. Duguit would abolish this conceptional technic
root and branch, and deal with the facts of life solely from the standpoint of a purpose crystallized in the idea of solidarity or social interdependence as he prefers to call it. But is not M. Duguit in this realistic program attempting an impossib!e feat of prestidigitation? Is
he not trying in effect to pump water without pipes? We can have an
administration of justice without rules as Salmond teaches, but can we
have a system of law without rules? As we understand the term law
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-the ordinary sense-we think not. Some years ago an American
legal scholar, Professor Bingham, vigorously defended the thesis that
the law does not consist of rules, but of events. The present reviewer
at that time attempted to argue the point in favor of the traditional
belief, but the controversy ended in the usual way-neither writer able
to get the point of the other. That incident and hundreds of others
which have come under our observation makes us despair of the
utility of a book review which does not accept an author as a whole,
or of any other controversial discussion. As has been said in another
connection, such writing is interesting to those who engage in it, and
it tires no one but the reader. A proof of this misery lies under our
hand. The first philosophical journal selected at random contains this
sentence under the title of Discussion: "Professor X's reply to my
note so far misses the point I have tried to make that it seems worth
while, etc." How many thousands of times has this familiar complaint
not been registered in print! We hardly have the courage to go on.
• . . Reference to the other debate is relevant in this that M. Duguit
has completed the labor of demolition of his American colleague without either being aware of the constructive-destructive efforts of the
other. Professor Bingham has annihilated rules of law and M. Duguit
has abolished legal concepts. With this unhappy situation confronting us, there is manifestly nothing left for lawyers to do but to become sociologists, or perhaps statisticians of social events.
Professor Duguit's quarrel is not with Michoud, Planiol, or
Saleilles, or yet with Gierke, Jellinek, or Bekker, but rather with.
legal science itself. We are constrained to believe that the major part
of M. Duguit's argument rests on an analytical misconception. In
tracing the movement toward objectivism, or rather as seems more
correct to say, factualism, he thinks he finds a progressive cutting down
of legal rights (literally translated "subjective right" which is a German usage likely to produce an erroneous connotation in English).
He looks forward to a time when the law will become thoroughly
socialized, and proleptically discards, as was shown, the idea of legal
right, as a metaphysical abstraction. In this he follows Comte who
however eminent he may have been in other fields of thought could
hardly be rated as a jurist or what requires much less knowledge of
law, a legal philosopher. It is customary with the positivists to employ
the term "metaphysical" as an epithet. It has otherwise no significance. The point of view taken is aided verbally by the unfortunate
legal idiom "abuse of rights," or as the translators and editors have
preferred to put it "misuse of rights." Now a right cannot be
"abused" or "misused." It cannot even be used except in a receptive
sense. No jurist is more aware of this than M. Duguit himself as a
quotation above from his chapter clearly shows.
We do not contend that Professor Duguit has mistaken the legal
phenomena which he describes as facts, but we think his interpretation
of them has led to erroneous conclusions. No doubt something has
been cut down in the last hundred years, and especially in the last
twenty years, and yet more especially in the last four years-but not
rights-not those metaphysical abstractions, if they must be so de-
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nominated. What has progressively been cut down is liberty and not
right. We insist that Professor Duguit has confused these terms, and
that such confusion is disastrous. We approach here a field of
analytical discussion much too extensive for the present purpose, but
we believe an examination of the ground will disclose that legal rights
far from having been eliminated have been little affected by the social
movement, and that the jurisprudential result has been a circumscribing
of the non juridical idea of liberty in favor of a larger group of legal
rights. In other words, the effect has been an increase in the range
and bulk of legal rights instead of their gradual absorption by the
notion of solidarity. The changes in social r6gime do not require the
abolition of Roman legal concepts. Indeed, as long as there is a reign
of law and not pure discretion as in the family life of early law, it is
impossible to conceive that the idea of concrete rights can be dispensed
with. Even in ancient Japanese law where the nearest equivalent of
right meant "share" the basic idea was still implicit.
It cannot be denied, however, that many Roman legal concepts
have been overhauled. There are two classes of such conceptsformal and normative.
An example of a formal legal concept is the notion that every
right must have a subject, a bearer, an owner. M. Duguit, as we have
seen, denies this for the case of associations whether private or public.
In the ordinary case which arises it is not technically important, but
when the legal character of the bearer of the right is in question, there
is no escape from the problem-some kind of technic must be resorted
to if we are to have a coherent science of law, and it will not do, at
least it will not suffice in jurisprudence, to decide in a. teleological
fashion without regard to other considerations. We do not emphasize
"elegantia" as an end in itself, but we do insist on intelligibility and a
reasonable amount of coherence. It will not do therefore to say that
such problems are of no interest to a modern jurist. This does not
require that we go to the extreme which in certain recurring epochs
have been witnessed in the administration of justice, where the realities
of life have been stretched on a bed of Procrustean form. Our criticisms here of Professor Duguit, and it is submitted with the deep respect
and homage due to one of his brilliant talents, is that he is an extremist
in these matters. We would for our own part prefer a middle ground
between a rigid scholasticism and an unbridled teleology. The personality of a corporation, is, it is true, a fiction, but it is no more of a
fiction, it is submitted, than the "persona" attributed by the law to a
human being; nor is the fiction more difficult, or less necessary.
The other kind of legal concepts, the normative, are only relatively fundamental. An example is the Roman law principle of no
liability without "culpa" which governed the administration of justice
in the courts pretty consistently for two thousand years. This principle is breaking down in many varieties of legal relations; but this
breakdown is not annihilating legal ideas, it is not destroying rights,
and it is not abolishing jural relations. All that progress means here
is a change of principle from the outworn and now unworkable idea of
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responsibility full of psychological absurdities and economic inequalities to that of accountability. Rights and jural relations still remain
and they would continue to exist even though the whole field of tort
law were put on a causation basis of liability.
It is interesting and hopeful to find that from the practical side,
the United States is not as far behind in social legislation as might
have been supposed. An alarm has sometimes been sounded against
contamination by foreign legal ideas. An inspection of this volume,
having in mind our own legislation, will show that we are already considerably contaminated, and it is not unlikely that we siall become
more contaminated with social ideas with the passage of years. Nor
is the risk of contamination altogether unilateral in these matters
since it appears that some American ideas (e.g. the homestead system, the probation system) have spread to foreign countries. The problems of this, a transitional epoch, have not commonly been discussed
by our own jurists with the same broad outlook as by the jurists of
France and Italy, but since these problems are part of a world-movement and can not be put aside in an attitude of conservatism or even a
fear of contamination, it may be anticipated that our jurists with the
inspiration of this and other similar volumes sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools, will relate more often than has heretofore been the case the daily problems of the law not simply, as is
customary, to a traditional, historical, and dogmatic technic, but to
the larger movements which are everywhere overtaking legal systems.
In other words, our legal problems must be considered henceforth not
alone in the light of a fixed system dominated by the economic requirements of an age which is behind us, but in view of a new social regimentation, whether we like it or not, which is too real to be ignored.
The mission of the lawyer in this era is more important than it has
ever been before. Enlightenment now is necessary in order that legal
science may not be obliterated in the surge of coming events. Without
this enlightenment, the enlightenment of such a volume as this one,
the lawyer truly must be as Cicero has it, a chanter of formulas (cantor
formularum) and a fowler of technicalities (auceps syllabarum).
Northwestern University.

ALBERT KoCOUREK.
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